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Abstract 
   This paper uses panel data from Japan to decompose productivity growth 
measured by the growth of output per labor unit into three components of efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation and technological progress. It then examines their 
determinants through a dynamic panel model.  In particular, this paper focuses on the 
question of how inequality, trust and humans affect the above components.  The main 
findings derived from empirical estimations are: (1) Inequality impedes not only 
improvements in efficiency but also capital accumulation. (2) A degree of trust promotes 
efficiency improvements and capital accumulation at the same time.  However, human 
capital merely enhances improvements in efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  There has recently been increasing interest in the economic consequences of 
factors such as ethnic heterogeneity, social polarization, social trust, social network and 
social capital; factors that have been used to shed light in areas of sociology or political 
science (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 2000)1.  
Reflecting this trend, a growing number of researchers have examined how and to what 
extent socio-economic factors are related to economic growth (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 
1997;Knack and Keefer, 1997; Montavo and Reynal-Querol. 2005; Zak and Knack, 
2001)2.   
For example, social polarization is considered to reduce growth through various 
channels. It has been found that ethnic and religious polarization has a large and 
negative effect on economic development through a reduction of investment and an 
increase in governmental consumption (Montalvo and Reynal-Quarol, 2005).  On the 
other hand, from the standpoint of economic polarization, opinions seem to vary as to 
the effects of income inequality, which is usually measured as the Gini coefficient for 
economic growth3.  Some researchers have found inequality has negative effects on 
growth (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Keefer and Knack, 2002; Mo, 2000; Perotti, 
1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sukiassyan, 2007).  By contrast, positive effects 
have also been observed (e.g., Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998) 4.  There are also 
inconclusive results (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo,2003).   
If socio-economic factors are profoundly associated with economic growth, it 
would be cogent to ask what are the channels through which socio-economic factors 
have an effect on growth.   The classical analysis of Kaldor (1956) argued that income 
                                                   
1 For instance, Spagnolo(1999) addresses the influence of social relations that are 
strengthened by social capital in cooperation with organization such as community.  
Not only interactions between trust and legal enforcement, but also those with social 
capital are examined when financial development is induced (Guiso et al, 2004).  
Alesina and La Ferrara(2000) investigated how heterogeneity affects participating 
behavior considered as collective action.  Lassen (2007) attempts to investigate 
influences of ethnic heterogeneity and trust on the size of the informal sector. 
2 Hall and Jones (1999) investigate how socio-economic factors are related to output per 
worker. 
3 In general, a country‟s level of economic inequality has been viewed as an outcome of 
its economic performance, such as by economic growth.  In recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in the opposite causality; that is to say, the question of how 
inequality affects economic growth. 
4 One of the explanations for such discordance is that a negative relationship is found 
for less developed countries and by contrast, a positive one is found for developed 
countries (Barro, 2000). 
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distribution has a critical effect upon capital accumulation, through which economic 
growth is affected. Recent studies show that low trust and heterogeneous societies 
reduce the rate of investment and therefore hamper capital accumulation, resulting in a 
decreasing growth rate (Zak and Knack, 2000; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  
Besides capital accumulation, as argued by Shcumpeter (1912), technological progress 
resulting from innovation generated by entrepreneurs involves diffusion of technology, 
leading to economic growth.   Accordingly, economic growth can be attributed to 
several channels such as improvements in efficiency, technological progress, and capital 
accumulation (Kumar and Russell, 2002).  The main purpose of this paper is to 
examine the determinants of efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and 
technological progress. 
  Previous reports (Yamamura and Shin 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, Zheng et al., 
1998; 2003) have used data envelopment analysis to construct a production frontier and 
decompose labor-productivity growth into three components of efficiency improvement, 
capital accumulation, and technological progress to more closely investigate economic 
growth.  Through regression analysis such reports have examined how various key 
independent variables have an effect on these components.  Applying the above 
approach, we attempt to decompose the effects of socio economic factors upon growth 
after controlling for unobservable fixed effects and endogeneity. 
 It is widely and generally acknowledged that post-war Japan has experienced 
the unprecedented economic growth.  Some researchers point out that this economic 
growth is in part because of socio-economic features formed through long-term local 
interaction within organizations such as the community (Hayami, 2001).  What is more, 
the industrial development of Japan was accelerated in part thanks to efficiency 
improvements in post-war Japan (Yamamura and Shin, 2007b; Yamamura et al., 2005).   
I thus found it appropriate to deal with the labor-productivity growth of Japan to 
examine how socio-economic factors affect growth through efficiency improvement.  
Accordingly this paper is concerned with Japan‟s labor-productivity growth.  The main 
findings here provide evidence as follows: Inequality impedes not only efficiency 
improvement but also capital accumulation. The degree of trust promotes both 
efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.  However, human capital just 
enhances efficiency improvement.  
  The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 explains briefly the 
strategy of the method used in the present paper and describes data sources.  
Subsequently, regression functions are presented.  Section 3 discusses the results of 
the estimations.  The final section offers concluding observations. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Data 
 
  Table 1 includes the independent variable definitions, means, and the coefficient 
of variation of the analyzed data.  Details of each variable are as follows.  The Gini 
coefficient of income is represented as GINI, in 1979, 1984,1989,1994,and 1999 as 
collected from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (various years).  Surveys were carried out in 1979 and 1996 by the 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai); respondents were asked, “Are 
there many persons whom you can trust in your neighborhood?”.   I use data from the 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979, 1996) in which the rate of respondents who said 
“yes” was separately reported for males and females at the prefecture level.  This rate 
is used as the indicator of trust.  The proxy of human capital represented as HC is 
obtained from Hi-stat5.  Apart from GINI, TRUST, and HC, all data were collected 
from the Index Corporation (2006). 
Data related to these variables are unavailable for some years.  As set out above, 
data of the Gini coefficient and the indicator of trust are insufficient to construct as 
panel data.  Therefore additional data were generated by interpolation based on the 
assumption of constant changes in rates to make up for this deficiency6.   
 
2.2.  Method 
 
We estimate the extent of efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and 
technological progress by data envelopment analysis (abbreviated hereafter as DEA 
analysis) using prefecture level panel data from 1979 to 1997.   First, we estimate the 
labor-productivity in each prefecture by means of the Malmquist index of DEA analysis 
(Banker et al. 1984).  Labor-productivity growth can be decomposed into efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation and technological progress.  This approach has an 
advantage over the growth accounting approach in that we can further decompose total 
                                                   
5 Data of human capital is available from the Hi-stat HP: 
http://21coe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/database.   
See http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/datamaking.pdf for a full 
account of the method of calculation. 
6 It must be noted that these data might suffer from measurement errors when 
interpolation is conducted. Caution should thus be exercised when interpreting the 
estimation results. 
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factor productivity growth, thereby obtaining more detailed information.  Second, we 
take these variables as dependent variables and estimate their determinants by 
controlling unobservable individual and time effects through fixed effects and dynamic 
panel models.7  This method allows us to assess how and to what extent inequality and 
additional key factors have an effect upon productivity growth through efficiency 
improvement and capital accumulation.  That is, whether and to what degree various 
factors determining productivity growth affect efficiency improvement and capital 
accumulation can be examined.    
 
2.3. Specification of the Regression Function   
  
   We would now like to formulate a regression function which takes 
labor-productivity, the level of efficiency, the level of per capita capital, and the level of 
technology as dependent variables denoted as LYit, respectively.  To estimate their 
determinants, the following equation is postulated: 
 
LYit =  1 LYit0 + 2LGINIit0 + 3 GHETit0 + 4 LTRUSit0 + 5LHCit0 + 6 LDYit0 + 
7 LRAIN it0  + 8 LSNOW it0  + ti   +uit ,  
 
εt , iti u,  represent the following unobservable effects; t„s year-specific effects, the i 
„s prefecture-specific effects, and the error term, respectively.  t0 is the lagged year of 
the t„s year. i  includes the time-invariant feature. The structure of the data set used 
in this study is a panel.  I incorporate a lagged dependent variable, LYit0, to control for 
the initial level.  We employed a dynamic panel model to reduce the omitted variable 
bias caused by time invariant individual specific features ( Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; 
Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998).  Development stages are considered to be covered in εt, 
and each year‟s dummy variables are included to restrain the time-specific effects 
(Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998).  The stage of development seems to be correlated 
with growth and inequality at the same time, causing the spurious correlation problem.  
Inclusion of year dummies is thought to alleviate this problem.  In addition to year 
dummies, human capital that is accounted for later appears to control for possible 
sources of spurious correlation since it stands for the stage of development8.  What is 
                                                   
7 Some prior research has used panel data to employ a fixed effects model (Banerjee 
and Duflo 1996, Forbes 2000, Li and Zou 1998,) and a dynamic panel model (Banerjee 
and Duflo 1996, Forbes 2000, Skiassyan 2007). 
8 Previous researches include variables used in this research and additionally control 
for various factors concerning institutional and economic conditions (e.g., Barro, 2000; 
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more, to address potential endogenous problems with lagged independent variables, I 
carry out dynamic panel estimation as developed by Arellano-bond (Baltagi, 2005) since 
dynamic panel models allow past realizations of the dependent variable to affect its 
current level.     
Additional key independent variables, regarded as socio-economic ones, are 
explained in the sections that follow 9 .  Combined expectations about efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress lead me to predictions 
about productivity growth since, as explained in the subsection 2.2, efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress can be obtained from 
the decomposition of productivity growth. 
 
2.4. Gini coefficient and generational heterogeneity  
 
LGINI represents the Gini coefficient of per capita income in logform, LGINI is 
incorporated into the function to capture income inequality effects in the base year t0.  
In conjecture based upon political economy arguments, redistribution of resources from 
the rich to the poor is more apt to be called for if income is unequally distributed.  In 
this case, income inequality is the cause of a reduction in economic growth since the 
incentive for workers to work harder and for entrepreneurs to generate innovation is 
reduced.  Consequently, there is a decline in the impetus to obtain more advanced 
technology than that presently existing, leading to a retardation of efficiency 
improvement.  As well, technology would not be progressed very much if there is a 
scarcity of innovation.  Another point to be borne in mind is that if there imperfect 
conditions related to the credit market, investors will have limited access to credit 
leading to reduced investment and thus capital accumulation will be hampered10.  
Thus, the signs of LGINI are predicted to be negative in each of the estimations. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Forbes, 2000; Hall and Jones, 1999; Keefer and Knack, 2002; 
Knack 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Perotti, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Zak 
and Knack,2001).    
 Institutional and geographical features can be controlled by the fixed effects 
estimation.  Also, there is little difference among institutions of the prefectures of 
Japan. This is why that we use only the important variables that are frequently used in 
the literature.     
9 Besides of socio-economic independent variables, indicators of a natural environment 
such as day hours, annual precipitation, and quantity of snowfall are added as a control 
variable. 
10 Besides the discussion as above, polarization such as inequality is thought to reduce 
the security of property and contractual rights, and through this channel polarization is 
inversely associated with economic growth. 
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     The function includes the log of the index of generational fractionalization 
represented as LGHET with the aim of capturing the effects of the generational 
heterogeneity11.  Recently researchers have draw attention to the structure of society 
from the view point of heterogeneity.  It is increasing acknowledged that people are 
unwilling to contribute to public goods benefiting other ethnic groups.  Findings 
reported, for instance, show that ethnic heterogeneity reduces the incentive for 
collective action (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) so decreasing voluntary tax compliance 
(Lassen, 2007) and reducing investment, thus hampering economic growth (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Montavo and Reynal-Querol. 2005).  From the above an inference 
that capital accumulation is not promoted, because of social heterogeneity impeding 
collective action calling for the provision of public goods, can be derived.  On the other 
hand, intuitively worker homogeneity is required for the smooth transmission of 
knowledge by economizing transaction costs.  Social heterogeneity thus hampers 
knowledge spillover resulting in deteriorating efficiency.  Nevertheless, little 
speculation has, with the exception of Vigdor(2004), taken place concerning the effects 
of generational heterogeneity on economic growth or collective action.  On the 
assumption that generational and ethnic heterogeneity have the same influence upon 
economic growth, it would be expected that generational heterogeneity impedes 
efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.   This leads us to expect LGHET to 
take the negative sign in the estimation of capital accumulation, efficiency improvement 
and therefore productivity growth. 
 
 2.5. Trust.   
     LTRUS stands for the log of the indicator of trust explained earlier.  Social trust, 
which is one of the elements of social capital, is thought to facilitate coordination and 
cooperation (Putnam, 2000).  That is to say, as presented in Knack and Keefer (1997), a 
high degree of mutual trust among people is a cause economizing transaction costs.  
This feature of trust enables technology to diffuse more smoothly and effectively, 
resulting in efficiency improvement.    
 With respect to the association of trust and capital accumulation, Zak and Knack 
                                                   
11 Following the general index of fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferra, 2002; Alesina et 
al., 2003), fragmentation can be written as 
 


I
i
i
N
n
FRA
1
2)(1 , 
where in is the number of people in the ith group, N is the population, and I is the 
number of groups in the country.  
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(2002) present an economic model said to underlie the positive effect of trust upon 
investment and present evidence coinciding with the model.  In this model, assuming 
that a principal-agent relationship holds between investors regarded as principals and 
brokers as agents, the principal is subject to moral hazard by the agent.  They show, in 
this setting, that the amount of investment is higher when trust is higher and therefore 
cheating by a broker is less likely to take place.  Considering this discussion of trust, 
leads me to a prediction that the signs of LTRUS become positive in estimations of 
efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and thereby productivity growth. 
 
2.6. Human capital.   
HC is the indicator of human capital.  It is generally and widely acknowledged 
that human capital makes a contribution to economic growth.  For this, higher 
education is likely to promote economic growth through various easily understandable 
channels.  For instance, more educated people make better use of expertise in 
generating new technology leading to technological progress. They also can get an 
advantage over less educated ones by learning from others so that information spillover 
becomes more facile and effectively.  As a result, efficiency is improved.  Nevertheless, 
the relationship between capital accumulation and HC seems to be equivocal.  Taking 
the above considerations together, HC is expected to take a positive sign for efficiency 
improvement and technological progress.  
 
3. Estimation results 
    
     The estimation results of the dynamic panel model with a year dummy for 
productivity growth, efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and technological 
progress are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  Economic inequality is 
associated with the extent of economic development (Barro, 2000) and therefore seems 
to be under the influence of economic growth.  If this is the case, the coefficients of 
GINI would suffer from an endogeneity bias.  Therefore, in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
in each of the tables, GINI is treated as endogenous explanatory variables, and we use 
the levels for two periods or more as additional instruments (Arellano, 2003).  In 
addition, results when second-order lags of an independent variable is included are 
reported in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) in each table.  
Sargan‟s over-identification test and second-order serial correlation test are 
available to check the validity of the estimation results in the dynamic panel model.  
Above all, a test for the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation for 
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the disturbance of the first-differenced equation is important because the consistency of 
the estimator relies upon no second-order serial correlation. 
    Before discussing the results, it is worth noting that because all variables 
incorporated in the estimation function are in log form, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
 
                   
3.1. Productivity growth 
 
       We begin by discussing Table 2 that shows results concerning the determinants 
of labor-productivity growth.  
  That income inequality and generational heterogeneity have a negative influence 
upon productivity growth is expressed clearly in the third and forth rows since all signs 
of the coefficients of LGINI and LGHET are negative and significant at the 1 % level.  
It is worth noting that the magnitude of LGHET is greater than 4, being far larger than 
those of other variables; suggesting that productivity growth decreases by more than 
4 % if generational heterogeneity rises by 1 %.  From this, I derive the argument that 
generational structure plays a more significant role in productivity growth than does 
income distribution.   
The fact that the signs of LTRUS are positive despite being statistically 
insignificant in some specifications coincided with the anticipation that trust is 
positively related to productivity growth.   I found it evident that human capital 
represented as LHC made a tremendous contribution to productivity growth because 
LHC takes the expected positive and significant signs, and its magnitude is far larger 
than LTRUS.     
     Even though only columns (4) and (8) pass both Sargan‟s test and the second-order 
correlation test, they do not affect the validity of the estimation results since the results 
are not affected by specifications. 
 
3.2. Efficiency improvement 
 
      I now discuss the results of Table 3.  The significant negative signs of the 
coefficients on LGNI, which persist under different specifications, indicate that 
economic inequality hampers efficiency improvement, as expected earlier.  
Corresponding with that anticipation, LGHET produces negative signs in all 
estimations even though no statistical significance is found.  The results shown above 
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tell me that socio-economic polarization and fractionalization such as economic 
inequality and generational heterogeneity cause efficiency improvement to decline.  It 
is noteworthy that LGHET is far larger in magnitude than LGNI, which coincides with 
the results shown in Table 2.    The combined results of LGNI and LGHET appear in 
Tables 2 and 3 lead me to argue that economic inequality and generational 
heterogeneity have a detrimental effect upon productivity growth, partly though their 
negative impact upon efficiency.   
  I see from the fifth row that LTRUS yields a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in all specifications.  This reflects that trust is positively 
associated with efficiency improvement and therefore endorses the expectation.  That 
is to say, learning from others is an easily facilitated route resulting in efficiency 
improvement because of the lower transaction cost where people have a tendency to 
trust each other.  The coefficients on LHC take the anticipated positive signs and are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level, which persists in all estimations.  The 
magnitude of LHC is from 3 to 7 times larger than that of LTRUS.   This implies that 
the individual ability captured by human capital makes a greater contribution to 
facilitating learning from others and then improves the efficiency than does the 
closeness of interpersonal relationships captured by trust.    In addition, as is later 
discussed in the following subsections, human capital hardly affects capital 
accumulation and technological progress.  I found it interesting that the predominant 
positive effect of human capital on productivity growth is not from its effect on capital 
accumulation and technological progress, but from its effect on efficiency improvement.  
During the high growth post-war period, Japan was thought to be an example of a 
newly industrializing economy on track to catch up with the advanced economies by 
borrowing technology (Hayami, 2001).  According to the evidence provided above, this 
catch-up mechanism seemed to persist even long after Japan became a developed 
country in that less developed prefectures learnt from developed ones, thereby 
improving efficiency.  What is more, a high degree of human capital has promoted this 
catch up mechanism among prefectures during Japan‟s modern period. 
 
3.3. Capital accumulation 
 
     Looking at the results presented in Table 5 reveals that income inequality reduces 
capital accumulation, which is consistent with the expectation since the coefficients on 
LGINI are consistently negative.  In contrast to this, generational heterogeneity 
produces positive signs, despite being statistically insignificant, which does not 
11 
 
correspondent to the prediction.  One plausible explanation is as follows.  The larger 
the size of a generation, the larger the number of rivals within it.  People are more 
likely to become rivals in various situations if they belong to the same generation, 
resulting in a hampering of collective action.  Therefore, generational heterogeneity is 
less likely to impede collective action (Yamamura, 2007) and so capital accumulation 
does not decline.  
  The significantly positive signs of LTRUS in most of the estimations tells me that 
higher trust is apt to stimulate investment and therefore increase capital.  The 
expectation about the effects of trust on capital accumulation is borne out in the results 
of the estimations, which coincide with the findings of Zak and Knack (2001).    
  LHC yields negative signs despite statistical insignificance in all estimations. 
Taking the results of the efficiency improvement estimations together, this can be 
interpreted as that higher human capital allocates more resources to enhance 
technological catch-up instead of capital accumulation, presumably because returns 
from physical capital are lower than those from technological catch-up in a developed 
country such as Japan.  This presumption seems to be in line with the evidence 
provided by Yamamura and Shin (2007b) that technological catch-up is three times as 
effective as capital accumulation, but that both have worked to cause economic 
convergence among Japanese prefectures.     
  Overall, the estimation results as discussed above are valid not only because they 
are robust to the choice of specifications, but also because they pass the second order 
correlation test in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), even though no estimation results pass 
Sargan‟s tests.   
 
3.4. Technological progress 
Table 5 shows the results of technology improvement.  The signs of LGINI and 
LGHET are not stable and are statistically insignificant.   Contrary to the expectation, 
the coefficients of LH produce negative signs.  Furthermore, none of the results of the 
estimations pass Sargan‟s and second-serial correlation tests.  Taking this together, the 
factors included in the function hardly affect technology progress.  Therefore, those 
factors have effects on the labor-productivity growth not through technological progress 
but through efficiency improvement and capital accumulation. 
We have so far examined the determinants of productivity growth, efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation and technological progress.  The combined results 
presented above make the following evident.  Inequality impedes not only efficiency 
improvement but also capital accumulation.  The degree of trust simultaneously 
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promotes efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.  On the other hand, 
results that do not coincide with the anticipation raised earlier and the estimations 
results do not pass any tests that check their validity when technology progress is 
examined. This is why findings are not presented regarding technological progress.  
Overall, the results of productivity growth and efficiency improvement, to a large extent, 
share similarities regarding the effects of income inequality, trust, and human capital.  
It follows from this that productivity growth is in the large part attributable to 
efficiency improvement although capital accumulation has some important effects upon 
productivity growth.   
 
4. Conclusion 
   
 In response to an upsurge in interest in ethnic heterogeneity, social capital, and 
general trust from a interdisciplinary point of view, increasing research has recently 
been devoted to accounting for how socio-economic factors affect economic growth. It 
thus seems to be open to question whether the influences of socio-economic factors on 
capital accumulation and diffusion of technology are different.  There have been, 
however, few attempts to examine the channels through which socio-economic factors 
have an effect upon productivity growth.  Accordingly, this paper, rather than putting 
an emphasis on just productivity growth, decomposes it into some components and then 
carefully investigates them.  To this end, using panel data from Japan, which is 
characterized by a homogenous society, this paper employs the DEA method and a 
dynamic panel model.   
 Key findings derived from empirical estimations that are invariant to alternative 
specifications are as follows. 
 (1) Inequality impedes not only efficiency improvement but also capital 
accumulation.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the elasticity of efficiency improvement 
with respect to inequality, which is -0.06, is about three times larger than that of capital 
accumulation.  
(2) The degree of trust promotes efficiency improvement and capital 
accumulation at the same time.  On the other hand, human capital only enhances 
efficiency improvement. The elasticity of efficiency improvement with respect to human 
capital is about 0.64, which is eight times larger than that with respect to trust. This 
means that human capital has a larger impact on technological catch-up, although both 
trust and human capital make contributions. 
    Based upon the findings indicated above, it can be plausibly pointed out that the 
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effect of trust on productivity growth through diffusion of technology is larger than 
through the increase in investment, although both diffusion of technology and capital 
accumulation are attributable to a high degree of trust.   Furthermore, the impact of 
human capital on productivity growth arises not from enhancing investment and 
technological progress but from promoting diffusion of technology.  Contrarily, 
economic polarization such as inequality hampers investment and diffusion of 
technology.     
 It should be noted that the present paper is limited to an empirical analysis of 
Japan in which institutional conditions such as the legal system do not vary and 
therefore cannot be considered as institutional factors.  Such conditions are the major 
issue remaining to be addressed in my future study. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Mean Coefficient 
of variation 
LY 
 
Output per worker in log form 1.18 0.55 
LE Level of efficiency in log form 
 
0.01*10-2 4.88*10-2 
LK Level of capital in log form 
 
1.24*10-2 2.04*10-2 
LT Level of technology in log form 
 
0.76*10-2 1.53*10-2 
LGINI 
 
Gini coefficients in log form 0.39 0.08 
LGHET 
 
Generation heterogeneity in log form 0.38 0.37 
LTRUS 
 
Magnitude of trust in log form 0.20 0.08 
LHC 
 
Human capital index in log form 1.75 0.43 
LDAY Day hours in log form 
 
0.20 0.08 
LRAIN Annual precipitation in log form 
 
0.36 0.28 
LSNOW Quantity of snowfall in log form 1.33 2.26 
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Table 2 
Determinants of productivity growth (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L Y 
    
(2)L Y 
    
(3) LY 
    
(4) LY 
    
(5) LY 
    
(6) LY 
    
(7) LY 
    
(8) LY 
    
LY_1 0.71** 
(26.1) 
0.71** 
(26.8) 
0.74** 
(19.3) 
0.71** 
(26.8) 
0.72** 
(27.27) 
0.73** 
(28.1) 
0.75** 
(19.6) 
0.75** 
(19.9) 
LY_2   -0.04 
(-1.10) 
-0.03 
(-0.96) 
  -0.03 
(-0.94) 
-0.02 
(-0.78) 
LGINI -0.09** 
(-3.00) 
-0.07** 
(-2.67) 
-0.08** 
(-2.92) 
-0.07** 
(-2.67) 
-0.08** 
(-2.90) 
-0.07** 
(-2.52) 
-0.08** 
(-2.83) 
-0.07** 
(-2.46) 
LGHET -4.13* 
(-2.27) 
-4.55** 
(-2.52) 
-4.28* 
(-2.32) 
-4.55** 
(-2.52) 
    
LTRUS 0.05* 
(1.94) 
0.03 
(1.47) 
0.05* 
(1.96) 
0.03 
(1.47) 
0.11* 
(1.89) 
0.08 
(1.44) 
0.11* 
(1.90) 
0.08 
(1.45) 
LHC 0.64** 
(3.39) 
0.56** 
(3.05) 
0.65** 
(3.40) 
0.56** 
(3.05) 
0.76** 
(4.18) 
0.69** 
(3.91) 
0.77** 
(4.19) 
0.70** 
(3.92) 
LDAY -0.04** 
(-2.55) 
-0.05** 
(-3.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.43) 
-0.05** 
(-3.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.49) 
-0.05** 
(-3.27) 
-0.04** 
(-2.39) 
-0.05** 
(-3.17) 
LRAIN 0.002 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
LSNOW -0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.002 
(-1.02) 
-0.002 
(-1.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.21 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.07 
 
0.00 
0.09 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.10 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.14 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of efficiency improvement (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L E 
    
(2)L E 
    
(3) LE 
    
(4) LE 
    
(5) LE 
    
(6) LE 
    
(7) LE 
    
(8) LE 
    
LE_1 0.80** 
(34.4) 
0.80** 
(35.4) 
0.85** 
(22.6) 
0.85** 
(22.9) 
0.80** 
(34.4) 
0.80** 
(35.4) 
0.85** 
(22.6) 
0.85** 
(23.2) 
LE_2   -0.06* 
(-1.66) 
-0.06* 
(-1.86) 
  -0.06* 
(-1.68) 
-0.06* 
(-1.89) 
LGINI -0.06* 
(-2.01) 
-0.06* 
(-1.96) 
-0.05* 
(-1.76) 
-0.05* 
(-1.71) 
-0.06* 
(-2.04) 
-0.06* 
(-2.00) 
-0.05* 
(-1.79) 
-0.05* 
(-1.74) 
LGHET -0.87 
(-0.48) 
-1.46 
(-0.81) 
-0.77 
(-0.42) 
-1.34 
(-0.73) 
    
LTRUS 0.07** 
(2.57) 
0.08** 
(2.76) 
0.08** 
(2.68) 
0.08** 
(2.85) 
0.16** 
(2.42) 
0.16** 
(2.58) 
0.17** 
(2.54) 
0.18** 
(2.69) 
LHC 0.52** 
(2.46) 
0.60** 
(3.01) 
0.56** 
(2.57) 
0.64** 
(3.09) 
0.53** 
(2.69) 
0.64** 
(3.39) 
0.57** 
(2.79) 
0.67** 
(3.45) 
LDAY -0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.02* 
(-1.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.87) 
-0.02 
(-1.43) 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.02* 
(-1.70) 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
-0.02 
(-1.45) 
LRAIN 0.005 
(1.04) 
0.004 
(0.82) 
0.005 
(1.07) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
0.005 
(1.02) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.004 
(0.82) 
LSNOW -0.003 
(-1.16) 
-0.002 
(-1.02) 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.003 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.12) 
-0.002 
(-1.11) 
-0.002 
(-1.01) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.11 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.39 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.07 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.21 
 
0.00 
0.26 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.09 
 
0.00 
0.22 
 
0.00 
0.27 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of capital deepening (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L K 
    
(2)L K 
    
(3) LK 
    
(4) LK 
    
(5) LK 
    
(6) LK 
    
(7) LK 
    
(8) LK 
    
LK_1 0.93** 
(90.1) 
0.93** 
(91.3) 
1.12** 
(26.4) 
1.11** 
(26.9) 
0.93** 
(96.5) 
0.93** 
(97.6) 
1.12** 
(26.4) 
1.11** 
(26.9) 
LK_2   -0.18** 
(-4.63) 
-0.18** 
(-4.63) 
  -0.18** 
(-4.64) 
-0.18** 
(-4.65) 
LGINI -0.02* 
(-1.88) 
-0.02* 
(-1.66) 
-0.02* 
(-1.66) 
-0.02 
(-1.44) 
-0.02* 
(-1.82) 
-0.02 
(-1.62) 
-0.02 
(-1.61) 
-0.02 
(-1.39) 
LGHET 0.41 
(0.43) 
0.61 
(0.81) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.27 
(0.27) 
    
LTRUS 0.03** 
(2.35) 
0.02* 
(1.96) 
0.02* 
(1.78) 
0.02 
(1.49) 
0.07** 
(2.52) 
0.06* 
(2.12) 
0.06* 
(1.90) 
0.04 
(1.60) 
LHC -0.09 
(-1.02) 
-0.07 
(-0.92) 
-0.08 
(-0.84) 
-0.06 
(-0.74) 
-0.10 
(-1.29) 
-0.09 
(-1.24) 
-0.08 
(-0.97) 
-0.07 
(-0.90) 
LDAY 0.001 
(0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(-0.47) 
-0.005 
(-0.59) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.005 
(-0.60) 
LRAIN 0.001 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
LSNOW -0.001 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-1.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.001 
(-1.09) 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.80) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.95 
 
0.00 
0.96 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.95 
 
0.00 
0.96 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are include, but not reported to save space. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of technological progress (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L T 
    
(2)L T 
    
(3) LT 
    
(4) LT 
    
(5) LT 
    
(6) LT 
    
(7) LT 
    
(8) LT 
    
LT_1 0.88** 
(63.3) 
0.89** 
(65.7) 
1.14** 
(29.5) 
1.15** 
(29.8) 
0.88** 
(64.9) 
0.89** 
(66.8) 
1.14** 
(29.6) 
1.15** 
(29.9) 
LT_2   -0.27** 
(7.29) 
-0.27** 
(7.31) 
  -0.27** 
(7.28) 
-0.27** 
(7.31) 
LGINI 0.01 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
0.008 
(0.51) 
0.005 
(0.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
LGHET -0.27 
(-0.26) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.59 
(-0.51) 
-0.11 
(-0.10) 
    
LTRUS -0.02 
(-1.42) 
-0.02 
(-1.24) 
-0.03* 
(-1.81) 
-0.02 
(-1.60) 
-0.04 
(-1.17) 
-0.03 
(-1.04) 
-0.06 
(-1.64) 
-0.05 
(-1.46) 
LHC -0.21* 
(-1.93) 
-0.16 
(-1.50) 
-0.24* 
(-1.94) 
-0.18 
(-1.52) 
-0.19* 
(-1.94) 
-0.16* 
(-1.70) 
-0.20* 
(-1.86) 
-0.17 
(-1.60) 
LDAY -0.005 
(-0.63) 
-0.005 
(-0.64) 
-0.007 
(-0.71) 
-0.007 
(-0.72) 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.63) 
-0.007 
(-0.69) 
-0.007 
(-0.72) 
LRAIN 0.001 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.86) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.002 
(0.76) 
LSNOW -0.003 
(-0.23) 
-0.004 
(-0.31) 
0.0003 
(0.21) 
0.0002 
(0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.30) 
-0.004 
(-0.30) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
0.0002 
(0.14) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space. 
